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Abstract: The essay argues for the modernity of Hegel‘s concept of the ‘profane
work of art’. (1) The first part rejects four standard objections to the modernity of
Hegel’s concept of ‘work of art’. (2) The second part deals with the function of the
physical form of the artwork. (3) The third part emphasizes (in discussion with
prominent ‘Hegelian aesthetics’) that the profane art after the so-called ‘End of Art’
is absolutely free in its contents. (3) For Hegel, the artists of all eras have to have
the technical skills to embody an interesting content adequately in the different
physical materials of the arts. This distinguishes the artist (in contemporary art
as well as in the art of past epochs) from dabblers and dilettantes. (4) So, the
fourth part briefly outlines what an ’adequate embodiment’ could be. (5) Without
discussing details, the essay at the end draws the following conclusion: Hegel’s
aesthetics are not outdated because of his concept of the profane work of art. The
profane work of art is created as an adequate physical embodiment of an interesting
content. An adequate physical embodiment is (i) clear, but also (ii) complex and
puzzling, and it is (iii) technically perfect. And the leading thesis is that all great
works of art (and especially the great works of art of our time) are well described
by this concept.
Hegel delivered his lectures on aesthetics in 1818 in Heidelberg for the first
time.1 Since then, nearly 200 years have passed. The artworks, which Hegel
knew and cites as examples, are even older. Nevertheless, this essay argues
for the modernity of Hegel’s concept of the ‘work of art’ by claiming that
this concept can be helpful for distinguishing between successful and failed
contemporary art.
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I. FOUR STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO THE MODERNITY
OF HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF ‘WORK OF ART’.
Those who argue for the modernity of Hegel’s concept of art expect opposi-
tion. Prima facie, four arguments seem to refute the thesis of the modernity
of Hegel’s concept of ‘art’. Some will argue that Hegel’s aesthetics are fixed
on the ideal of beauty. In contemporary art, however, the abhorrent and dis-
gusting belong self-evidently to the repertoire. Quentin Tarantino’s Django
Unchained and Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking are examples in place. Oth-
ers will argue that Hegel’s aesthetics are so much in the service of religion,
that 99% of contemporary art would have no chance to be designated by Hegel
as ‘works of art’. Still others will say that Hegel was a Classicist—who cares
today for the statues of antiquity? One could finally argue that according to
Hegel art found its ‘end’ since the Reformation. Hegel’s concept of ‘work of
art‘ is to be up to date? Nothing less than that! Thus, the objections could
be summarized.
1. Are Hegel’s aesthetics fixed on the ideal of beauty?
The very first sentence of Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik declares:
“These lectures are devoted to Aesthetics. Their topic is the spacious realm
of the beautiful; more precisely, their province is art, or, rather, fine art”.2 But
as soon as you read further, you will notice, that Hegel repeatedly chooses ex-
amples of—as we would phrase it— ‘ugly art’. This irritating discrepancy has
often been noted.3 To resolve this problem, some point to the fact that Hegel’s
lectures were edited posthumously by Hotho. Hegel himself would have faced
ugly art, whereas Hotho still adhered to a Classicist ideal of beauty.4 This
interpretation, however, runs contrary to the fact that the introduction was
written by Hegel himself and it is here where he makes the beautiful the
object of his lectures.
For the Oxford Hegelian Bernard Bosanquet, the lectures represent two
different layers of Hegel’s aesthetics.5 According to Bosanquet, The early
Hegel adhered to the concept of beautiful art following the early Schelling.
Later, he turned to a dialectic view of beauty and ugly. Bosanquet writes:
“The fact is that Hegel’s notion of beauty is so positive throughout, that
he is not led to devote any special treatment to what, as its negation, falls
outside his track of inquiry”.6 When German Hegelians such as Rosenkranz
and Weisse discovered the ugly for the aesthetics some years later, according
to Bosanquet they only developed a potential of Hegel’s aesthetics that Hegel
hasn’t seen himself, but that could already be found within.
But Bosanquet’s interpretation runs at least against two counter argu-
ments. The first objection is that Hegel was not interested in the fulfilment
of a desire for pure beauty (as Bosanquet also says), but rather in the em-
bodiment of the truth: For Hegel a work of fine art is ‘das sinnliche Scheinen
der Idee’.7
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Even more important is a second objection. In his lectures on aesthetics,
Hegel does not position the aesthetically ugly as the negation of beauty. A
work of art is ‘beautiful’ according to these lectures if it embodies the ‘con-
crete truth’ of a time adequately. Therefore, those works of art which do not
embody this truth adequately are opposing beauty.8 The opposite of meta-
physical beauty in art is failed art, but not the aesthetically ugly art. In
fact, there isn’t any discrepancy within Hegel’s aesthetics if you distinguish
between metaphysical beauty, formal beauty, and aesthetic beauty. (i) A
work of art is beautiful in an aesthetic sense if it sounds harmonious or looks
charming and pleasing. (ii) According to Hegel, within the physical form of
the work of art may be nothing except what is in an essential relationship
to the content and what expresses the content.9 Thus, one could say that
a work of art is beautiful in a formal sense if its physical form of the work
of art adequately embodies its content.10 (iii) But Hegel is interested in the
metaphysical beauty, and a work of art is beautiful in a metaphysical sense if
it adequately11 embodies the concrete truth of a time.12 The ‘concrete truth
of a time’ is the sum of the religious interests of whole epochs.13 The cru-
cial point is that such a content is adequately embodied if the physical form
or shape of the artwork derives from and follows the content. This means
that metaphysical beauty even must be ugly in an aesthetical sense if ugliness
corresponds to its metaphysical content. Hegel explicitly says that a tortured
Jesus on the cross should not look beautiful, because this would not be an
adequate embodiment.14 On the other hand, works of art have to be beautiful
in an aesthetical sense, if their content requires a beautiful form. For Hegel,
this was the case with the works of art in the Greek antiquity, which were
beautiful even in an ideal sense. Hegel deals in his lectures on aesthetics with
works of art that are metaphysically beautiful, which can be aesthetically
beautiful or ugly regarding their content. The first sentence of the Vorlesun-
gen speaks of metaphysically beautiful art that can be both beautiful and
ugly in an aesthetic sense. A fixation on aesthetic beauty does not exist in
Hegel’s thinking; the opposite is the case. Because only a fixation on aesthetic
beauty would contradict my thesis of the modernity of Hegel’s concept of art,
the first possible objection to my thesis is rejected.
2. No place for modern secular art in Hegel’s aesthetics
A second objection says that there is no place for the modern secular art
in Hegel’s aesthetics, because Hegel’s works of art must embody religious
contents.15 As I already said, the metaphysical beautiful work of art for Hegel
has to embody the religious interests of entire eras. Moreover, Hegel brings
up almost exclusively religious works of art as examples: In the context of the
Symbolic art he mentions amorphous shapes of nature deities; in the context
of the Classical art he mentions the stone statues of the Olympian gods; and
in the context of the Romantic art form he discusses paintings of the Virgin
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Mary and Jesus Christ. So the second objection seems to be true. But there
also is the so-called ‘profane art’ after the end of the metaphysical art!
The age of profane art begins with the Reformation. The point is: profane
art is no longer devoted to the representation of truth.16 It is no less art than
is the metaphysically beautiful art (see below section 1.4). But profane works
of art have no longer to embody religious contents. As Hegel says, a profane
work of art is free to embody any content that the artist considers to be
interesting. Hegel’s metaphysical fine art is in fact committed to religion,
while secular art can embody any content. So the second objection to my
thesis is also rejected.
3. The objection of Classicism
By pointing to profane art, you can also refute the third objection of Classicism.17
The art which represents the ideal of beauty, according to Hegel, is the art
of ancient Greece. Their stone statues were metaphysically beautiful in an
ideal sense, because they were perfectly beautiful in a formal sense, and,
thus, also in an aesthetical sense: They embodied the religious interests of
Greek antiquity in aesthetically beautiful forms as a perfect unity of form
and content. Classical or Neo-classical art, however, is profane art, which
does not even copy the art of antiquity but the profane art of the Renais-
sance: The Classicist Winckelmann admires Raphael’s ‘Dresdener Madonna’
and Michelangelo’s ‘David’ and not the art of ancient Greece itself. Hegel
is not a Classicist because he declares the stone statues of the Greek gods
as embodiments of the ideal of beauty and not the profane Classicistic art.
Thus the third objection is refuted.
4. Art has reached its ‘End’
One could finally argue that there cannot be full-fledged works of art in
modernity because art has reached its ‘End’ with the Reformation, according
to Hegel. (i) Firstly, this ‘rumour’ (in German: ‘Gerücht’) is against Hegel’s
dialectical view on history.18 According to this view, something that has once
evolved from the historical necessity of a time, does not just disappear, but
goes with a new era into a new stage. The wheel of history is never simply
turned back. So after the so-called ‘End of Art’ remains, what had lifted
the work of art over the natural objects at the beginning of the symbolic art
form: that works of art are created (and not found) to embody adequately a
content in a physical form (in other words: to be beautiful in a formal sense).
Therefore, there is art after the so-called ‘End of Art’, but it has changed
its function: It is no longer obliged to embody the absolute, because that
happens elsewhere now (in religion and finally in philosophy). (ii) Because
there obviously was very successful profane art after the Reformation, it would
secondly have been obviously false, if Hegel had claimed that there cannot be
art in the full sense of the term after the ‘End of Art’. In fact, he explicitly
writes ‘the name of works of art should not be withheld’ to the productions
264
Marie-Luise Raters
of profane art after the art of the Romantic art form.19 That Hegel is not
further concerned with profane art, although he obviously has appreciated
and admired it, can simply be explained by the fact that his aesthetic is not
a general theory of art, but a theory of the metaphysically beautiful art as
part of its philosophy of the absolute spirit.20
II. THE PHYSICAL FORM
The first part refuted four objections to the thesis of the modernity of Hegel’s
concept of ‘work of art’. The modernity of Hegel’s concept of art will be
explained now by a very short reference to some other so-called ‘Hegelian
aesthetics’.
1. The Estetica of Benedetto Croce
The Estetica of the Italian Benedetto Croce from 1902 is read as ‘Hegelian
aesthetics’ because it is part of a philosophy of mind.21 The leading thesis
is that art is the lowest mental activity as an intuitive formative activity.22
The raw materials for the formative activity of art are feelings. The result is
‘expression’ as ‘formed feeling’.23 This expression Croce also calls an ‘artwork’.
The crucial point is: according to Croce such an artwork does not necessarily
have a physical form. For Croce, physical forms are merely a ‘memory aid’
for the reconstruction of the original mental activity.24 For Hegel, however,
the physical forms as adequate embodiment of the content are indispensable
for his concept of ‘work of art’. Art is not just a mental activity; there have
to be physical artworks. For Hegel, every work of art has a physical form.
2. John Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics
In Anglo-Saxon literature, John Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics Art as Ex-
perience of 1934 are referred to as ‘Hegelian aesthetics’, because they are
influenced by Croce’s aesthetics and by the aesthetics of the Second Oxford
Hegelian (see 3.2). In fact, however, Dewey’s aesthetics are not interested
in the work of art, but in the aesthetic and the ordinary experiences.25 He
discusses works of art only additionally as one of many possible physical em-
bodiments of human experiences: Dewey speaks of factory buildings and tidy
rooms.26 According to Hegel, however, artworks, unlike factories, are created
for the sole purpose of embodying their content adequately. Unlike factories,
artworks have no other function than the adequate embodiment of a content.
Ready-made objects are no objection because they are also created in a cer-
tain sense by exposing everyday objects (such as urinals) in a museum in an
aesthetic style. To draw a first conclusion: According to Hegel, a work of
art is something physical that was created for the sole purpose of its physical
form embodying its content adequately.
265
Artists, Dabblers, Dilettantes.
III. THE CONTENT
This raises two further questions. The first question is whether a work of
art must have a special content. The second question is what an adequate
embodiment could be. Again, I will explain my position by reference to
some other so-called ‘Hegelian’ theories of art. I’ll start with the question of
content.
1. Socialist Realism
According to Hegelian aesthetics of Socialist Realism, art has to embody the
socialist utopias of a better world.27 On the one hand, Hegel’s examples of
profane art prove that Hegel himself appreciated political art.28 On the other
hand, the aesthetics of Socialist Realism is a relatively clear call for censorship.
This runs contrary to Hegel, because according to Hegel (as has been said
already) the profane works of art are absolutely free in their contents. The
socialist theory of art exposes an interesting sort of possible content for art,
but one cannot oblige profane art generally to this one content according to
Hegel.
2. The aesthetics of Bernard Bosanquet
There is a similar problem in the aesthetics of Bernard Bosanquet. In con-
trast to Croce, Bosanquet emphasizes strongly the indispensability of physical
embodiment. Nevertheless, he runs contrary to Hegel in one important re-
spect. Bernard Bosanquet writes, that Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics starts
with “man’s universal need to set the seal of his inner being on the world,
in order to recognize himself therein”.29 The crucial point is: For Bosanquet,
the ‘inner being’ is identical with the feelings of the people. So, they oblige
the artwork to embody intense feelings. Intense feelings undoubtedly have
always been very important in art: What would the theatre be without jeal-
ousy, and what would music be without enthusiasm or pathos. But according
to Hegel, art is ‘born of the Spirit’. In contrast to the beautiful in nature, the
metaphysically beautiful art and the profane art have their origins in mental
activities. That means that you have to think about the content of a work
of art.30 For Adorno, the documentation of real feelings is a ‘foreign toxin’
in art31 On the one hand you can think and feel at the same time, and on
the other hand you can think about your feelings—that’s what you should
do according to Bosanquet, if you enjoy art. Therefore, a work of art, which
embodies an intense feeling, can also be a challenge for the thinking. But
according to Hegel the profane art should be absolutely free in its contents.
And so art should not be obliged to embody intense feelings and nothing else.
3. Adorno’s aesthetics
The same argument is to be turned against Adorno’s aesthetics. According
to Adorno’s posthumously published aesthetics, art is both ‘autonomous’ and
‘fait social’. Because art is ‘autonomous’, it can’t be fixed by concepts what
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art really is.32 So the theory of art can say, what art is, but it can’t say,
what it will be or what it should be.33 But art also is ‘fait social’. That
means, that art also is the product of the society in which it is created. Both
mean that the art (according to Adorno) is a free instance for subtle critique of
society.34 Undoubted social and political criticism is a very important function
of profane art. But, again, it has to be emphasized that you cannot impose
criticism on profane art, because, Hegel argues, profane art is absolutely free
in its content.35 To draw a second conclusion: According to Hegel, profane
art after the ‘End of art’ is absolutely free in its content.36
The content may be a religious or critical or enthusiastic or utopian or
classicistic content, but it has not necessarily to be like this. According to
Hegel everything can be the content of a profane work of art. In fact, he
specifically mentions flowers, trees and ordinary cooking pots.37 The only
important thing is that the content is in any way interesting for the people
of the time. And this has the very important consequence that the profane
work of art has to be interpreted. In metaphysically beautiful art the question
‘what is the artist trying to tell us?’ has no place, because it is clear according
to Hegel, that the metaphysically beautiful artworks embody the religious
interests of the people of an era. But because profane art is free in its content,
the question for the meaning of an artwork arises very clearly. In profane art,
the question of the meaning of an artwork is not only legitimate but even
central for the reception.
IV. THE ADEQUATE EMBODIMENT
That means, however, that there is no specific content that could make the
works of art valuable—unlike in Hegel’s metaphysically beautiful art before
the End of Art. So now the following question arises: If it is now not the
content that makes a work of art into a ‘work of art’— what else could
it be? In my eyes, the answer is clear: The adequate embodiment of the
content is crucial. Hegel leaves no doubt that profane art after the End of
Art is subjected to this requirement as well as the metaphysically beautiful
art before the End of Art. But what exactly is an adequate embodiment?
Surprisingly, for this question there seems to be a broad consensus be-
tween the different Hegelian aesthetics: A physical form embodies its content
adequately, if it evokes associations that guide the interpretive thinking to-
wards the direction of the content. I think that Hegel would have agreed: the
already mentioned example, that a tortured Jesus may not look aesthetically
beautiful, confirms this thesis in principle. The same applies to the other
examples discussed by Hegel. In details, however, the different Hegelian aes-
thetics set different priorities.
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1. Socialist Realism
For the aesthetics of Socialist Realism, most important is the clarity and
general comprehensibility of the embodiment. They claim a clear relation be-
tween ugly physical forms and the decadence and the evil of the capitalistic
societies on the one hand, and between beautiful and sublime physical forms
and the socialistic good and the utopian on the other hand. In the back-
ground are probably at work the dialectical aesthetics of Rosenkranz and
Weisse, written soon after Hegel’s death. The guiding question of the ‘aes-
thetics of the ugly’ of Karl Rosenkranz from 1853 was why there can be ugly
art when the generating of beauty should be the task of art? Rosenkranz’s
answer is based on the premise that the evil finds its adequate physical em-
bodiment in ugly forms.38 But why ugly art? Rosenkranz’s answer is that
ugly art produces a dialectical desire for the beautiful, and in a second step
this desire for the beautiful produces a desire for the good. The aesthetics of
Socialist Realism has joined this conviction. In my eyes, however, it is hard
to imagine that you will look for beauty if you see something that is very
ugly or cruel.39 A person who sees the film Django Unchained will probably
be repelled by the, as yet unseen, brutality of the protagonist. Perhaps his
imagination is excited when he wonders whether he would also practice vigi-
lante justice if he were to live in a lawless society. But I can’t imagine that he
will feel a desire for an abstract good. A second objection is that bad people
are not necessarily ugly and good people are not necessarily beautiful. Dr.
Mengele was aesthetically a very attractive person, but he committed horrible
crimes in Auschwitz concentration camp. The most important objection is
that despite of the necessary conventionality of the aesthetic signs, the em-
bodiment must also be ‘unseen’ in the sense that it arouses curiosity. Only
an interesting form evokes curiosity, interpretative activity and thinking; and
only an interesting form embodies an interesting content adequately. But
only an unseen physical form can be an interesting form in art. This means
that the physical embodiment may not be schematic because a schematic
embodiment is banal and boring and makes every interpretation superfluous:
the artwork has failed.
2. Adorno
Particularly, Adorno emphasizes the importance of an unseen and puzzling
form in art. According to Adorno, beyond all clarity of the physical embod-
iment there must also be a mystery. I think that Hegel would agree again.
For Hegel, you have to think about the content of a work of art. The inter-
pretation of the artwork is intellectually only interesting when it is difficult.
That means that the physical form also must hide and disguise the content.
According to Adorno the physical embodiment must also be a ‘puzzle’. There
have to be tensions and fractures, because banality is boring. How art at
the same time can give clear associations and be puzzling explains Adorno
in his book Alban Berg: Meister des kleinen Übergangs.40 In a central scene
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of the opera Wozzeck, the protagonist Wozzeck shaves his Captain. Mean-
while the Captain is talking: He says that there will soon be a North-South
wind. A North-South wind is nonsense. And that’s why Berg composes an
interval that is nonsense in any key at this place. Wozzeck responds like a
machine. Again and again he repeats the same sentence “Yes, Sir Captain”
(in German: “Jawohl, Herr Hauptmann”). The associations are very clear:
A North-South wind is nonsense, and Wozzeck is acting as a machine in this
scene. The evoking of associations is very clear, but it is not simple or banal,
because you need well-trained ears and even some musicological knowledge
to understand your own associations. To summarize: As Adorno correctly
emphasizes, beyond all clarity the physical embodiment must also be a puz-
zle, because you have to think about the profane work of art as about the
metaphysical art according to Hegel.
3. The perfect technical design
But a particularly important third aspect is often neglected in Hegelian aes-
thetics. This important third aspect is the perfect technical design of the
physical embodiment. It might not be important in the first Symbolic art
form but it is already important in the Classical and Romantic art forms,
and it is particularly important in profane art. According to Hegel, the phys-
ical form of every artwork has to derive from and follows the content: Within
the physical form of the work of art “may be nothing” except “what is in an
essential relationship to the content and what expresses the content”.41 This
means that within the form there should be nothing that is superfluous be-
cause it does not embody the content. But this can only succeed if the artist
is technically perfect. Errors and oversights would contaminate the form and
distract from the content. What Hegel at the beginning of his lectures says
about the metaphysical fine art is (according to the dialectical principles) also
preserved in profane art. It is significant that Hegel only demands that the
profane artist has the technical skills needed to treat the physical material of
his art.42
Both Adorno and Bosanquet emphasize the importance of the artistic
craft for successful art.43 But while Adorno is particularly interested in the
dialectical relationship between art and society, Bernard Bosanquet, in his
Three Lectures in Aesthetics of 1915, focuses very specifically on the question
of whether and to what extend a theory of art can define any technical rules
for artistic creation. The reason is that the Second Oxford Hegelian is not
only influenced by Hegel, but also by the English art historian John Ruskin,
who taught painting, design and drawing in some famous Colleges in Oxford.
Therefore, the Second Oxford Hegelian realized the importance of technical
perfection for the difference between good and failed profane art.
One of Bosanquet’s examples is Homer’s song on the golden war shield
of Achilles created by the divine Hephaistos. For Bosanquet, the song is
“perhaps the earliest aesthetic judgement which Western literature contains”.
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He quotes Homer as follows: “Behind the plough the earth went black, and
looked like ploughed ground, though it was made of gold; that was a very
miracle of his craft”. It is to emphasize that for Bosanquet the ‘miracle’ is
not that we can recognize symbols and pictures. The “miracle of craft” is that
the “mind possesses a magic by which it can extract the soul of the actual
thing or event, and confer it on any medium which is convenient to him, the
wall of a cave, or a plate of gold, or a scrap of paper.”44 For Bosanquet the
miracle of craft is that an artist is able to form the physical material of his art
so that we feel to be on a field if we see a golden plate. It may sound stuffy, but
in my eyes this third aspect of the technical perfection is a very central feature
of all successful art since great artworks from different genres and periods all
have this one common feature: that they are technically perfect. If a pianist
is playing wrong notes, you will be distracted from the composition because
you will feel compassion with the pianist. If he screwed with the piano stool
for too long, the audience laughs. The result is failed art.
The Germans say “Kunst kommt von Können’’ (a translation might be:
“art is based on skill”). You will not become automatically a good pianist by
practising the piano a lot. But you will not become a pianist at all if you don’t
practise the piano. The genius of Mozart is not a counter-example, because
Mozart had been practising the piano already as a baby! Take the artwork The
Diaoyu Islands of Ai Wei Wei as an example.45 You can read on a sign that
the Diaoyu Islands are unoccupied until today. But the Chinese government
will destroy the natural paradise very soon because oil was found. The leading
idea or the ‘content’ of the artwork is clear: Ai Wei Wei’s islands are made of
stone (marble), because this physical material is highly resistant. It is very
beautiful because the untouched nature of the islands is very beautiful. The
idea to embody the islands in stone seems to be simple. But Ai Wei Wei took
a special marble: He took the very precious marble of the quarry from which
the marble for the Forbidden City of the Chinese Emperors in Peking and
for Lenin’s grave were taken. You have to see this if you want to understand
this artwork. Perhaps the content is interesting only for the Western world,
but not for Chinese people. Nevertheless, more important is the fact that
the marble is perfectly designed. Even though some people say the content
is simple, in my eyes it is really great art because of its technical perfection.
You would admire Ai Wei Wei’s critical thoughts and his refined ideas for
physical embodiments if you were to visit the exhibition. But above all, you
would admire his perfect craftsmanship—and I think that is true for all great
art beyond all differences in content and form.
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V. CONCLUDING
Certainly, I should discuss in more detail what is an interesting content and
an adequate embodiment. But unfortunately, there is no opportunity to go
further. An essay can be only an impulse of thought and a brief sketch. So my
last and final conclusion is: Hegel’s aesthetics is not outdated: his concept
of the profane work of art is still relevant. The profane work of art (1) is
created (2) as an adequate physical embodiment (3) of an interesting content.
An adequate physical embodiment is (2.i) clear, but also (2.ii) complex and
puzzling, and it is (2.iii) technically perfect. My thesis is that all great works
of art since Hegel’s End of Art, and especially the great works of art of our
time, are beyond all differences in details well described by this Hegelian
concept of a ‘profane work of art’. The good art of Social Realism is as
technically perfect as Alban Berg’s opera Wozzeck or as Shakespeare’s play
Romeo and Julia. These artworks are ‘profane works of art’ according to
Hegel’s concept, and they are ‘good artworks’ because they are beautiful in a
formal sense, that is that they physically embody an interesting content both
adequately and technically perfect.46
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NOTES
1. Gethmann-Siefert 1998, 31.
2. Hegel 1975, 1. The German original: “Die-
se Vorlesungen sind der Ästhetik gewid-
met; ihr Gegenstand ist das weite Reich
des Schönen, und näher [. . . ] die schöne
Kunst”(Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 11).
3. Jung 1987, 123; Zelle 1987, 11.
4. Gethmann-Siefert 1977, 127-149; 129.
5. For Anglo-Saxon Hegelianism generally
and Oxford-Hegelianism specifically see
Raters 2005, 251-323.
6. Bosanquet 1917, 355.
7. Hegel 1986b, vol.13 151f. Engl. “There-
fore the beautiful is characterized as the
pure appearance of the Idea to sense.”
(Hegel 1975, 111).
8. Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 133f.
9. “Im Kunstwerk ist nichts vorhanden, als
was wesentliche Beziehung auf den Inhalt
hat und ihn ausdrückt.” (Hegel 1986b, vol.
13, 132), Engl. “In the work of art nothing
is there except what has an essential rela-
tion to the content and is an expression
of it.” (Hegel 1975, 95). See also: “Denn
die Kunst ergreift diese Form weder, weil
sich dieselbe so vorfindet, noch, weil es kei-
ne andere gibt, sondern in dem konkreten
Inhalte liegt selber das Moment auch äu-
ßerer und wirklicher, ja selbst sinnlicher
Erscheinung.” (Hegel 1986b, vol. 13 101f.),
Engl. “For art does not seize upon this
form either because it just finds it there
or because there is no other; on the con-
trary, the concrete content itself involves
the factor of external, actual, and in-
deed even sensuous manifestation.” (Hegel
1975, 71). “Aus diesem Grund allein sind
Inhalt und Kunstgestalt ineinandergebil-
det.” (Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 102), Engl.
“For this reason alone are content and
artistic form fashioned in conformity with
one another.” (Hegel 1975, 71).
10. An adequate embodiment is not per se a
perfect embodiment or a perfect unity of
content and form. In fact, this could hap-
pen only once in the history of mankind
at the time of classical art form: Accord-
ing to Hegel, the unity of content and
form has been so complete that the Di-
vine was present with and worshiped in the
stone statues of the gods of ancient Greece.
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According to Hegel, the certain spiritual
characters of the Olympic gods have be-
come bodily in the stone statues. (Hegel
1986b, vol. 14, 83). But an embodiment
may also be adequate if it is not such a
perfect unity of form and content.
11. Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 50
12. Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 21.
13. Die Kunst scheint “zuzeiten den höch-
sten und absoluten” Bedürfnissen “Genü-
ge zu tun, indem sie an die allgemeinen
Weltanschauungen und religiösen Interes-
sen ganzer Epochen und Völker gebun-
den ist.” (Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 50), Engl.
“art seems to proceed from a higher im-
pulse and to satisfy higher needs, at times
the highest and absolute needs since it is
bound up with the most universal views
of life and the religious interests of whole
epochs and peoples.” (Hegel 1975, 30).
See also: “Der absolute Geist kann nicht
in solcher Einzelheit des Gestaltens expli-
ziert werden; der Geist der schönen Kunst
ist darum ein beschränkter Volksgeist, des-
sen an sich seiende Allgemeinheit” in “eine
unbestimmte Vielgötterei zerfällt.” (Hegel
1986a, vol. 10, 442), Engl. “In such single
shapes the absolute mind cannot be made
explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit
is a limited natural spirit whose implicit
universality, when steps are taken to spec-
ify its fullness in detail, breaks up into an
indeterminate polytheism.” (Hegel 1971,
294).
14. “Christus gegeißelt, mit der Dornenkro-
ne, das Kreuz zum Richtplatz tragend, ans
Kreuz geheftet, in der Qual eines langsa-
men Todes hinsterbend, läßt sich in den
Formen der griechischen Schönheit nicht
darstellen.” (Hegel 1986b, vol. 14, 153),
Engl. “Christ scourged, with the crown
of thorns, carrying his cross to the place
of execution, nailed to the cross, passing
away in the agony of a torturing and slow
death—this cannot be portrayed in the
forms of Greek beauty.” (Hegel 1975, 538).
15. As Rosenkranz did 148 years before, An-
nemarie Gethmann-Siefert, also, sees a re-
ligious prejudice in Hegel. (Gethmann-
Siefert 1984, 344). Rosenkranz wrote
in 1836: “So bildete sich das Vorurt-
heil, als sei es der Hegelschen Ästhetik
nicht um das Schöne, sondern um die von
den Kunstbilden verhüllte Wissenschaft zu
tun. Sie gestehe dem Schönen kein eigent-
hümliches Gebiet zu, sondern erblicke in
ihr nur eine geschickte Maskierung logi-
scher, ethischer und theologischer Kate-
gorien.” (Rosenkranz 1836, 184). English
translation by P. Naderer: “Thus, the prej-
udice has been formed, that Hegel’s Aes-
thetic was not dealing with beauty itself
but instead with science being masked by
those art images. It would not allow the
beauty a domain of its own, but rather sees
in it a cleverly made disguise of logical,
ethical and theological categories.” Hegel’s
Enzyklopädie explicitly says that the meta-
physically beautiful work of art has to em-
body the religious beliefs and hopes of an
era. (Hegel 1986a, 371).
16. Hegel 1986b, vol. 14, 235f.
17. See Kuhn 1966, 15-144, without accusing
the publisher Hotho. See also Gethmann-
Siefert 1983, 238, 242f.
18. ‘Gerücht’ is the subtitle of Geulen’s book
on the discussions after Hegel’s alleged
‘End of Art’. See Geulen 2002.
19. In German: “Nach diesen Seiten hin dür-
fen wir den Erzeugnissen dieses Kreises
den Namen von Kunstwerken nicht vorent-
halten.” (Hegel 1986b, vol. 14, 224), Engl.
“In view of these aspects we may not deny
the name of works of art to the creations
of this sphere.” (Hegel 1975, 596).
20. See Hegel 1986b, vol. 14, 226ff.
21. Croce 1964.
22. Croce 1964, 1.
23. Croce 1964, 355.
24. Croce 1964, 89-106.
25. Dewey 2008, 1981ff. See also Raters-Mohr
1994.
26. Dewey 2008, 98–114.
27. See for example Kagan 1974, 14, 180, 156.
28. Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 255ff.
29. Bosanquet 1917, 346.
30. “Die Schönheit aber ist nur eine bestimm-
te Weise der Äußerung und Darstellung
des Wahren und steht deshalb dem begrei-
fenden Denken, wenn es wirklich mit der
Macht des Begriffs ausgerüstet ist, durch-
aus nach allen Seiten hin offen”. (Hegel
1986b, vol. 13, 127), Engl. “But Beauty is
only a specific way of expressing and repre-
senting the true and therefore stands open
throughout in every respect of conceptual
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thinking, so long as that thinking is actu-
ally equipped with the power of concept.”
(Hegel 1975, 92). See also Hegel 1986b,
vol. 14, 242; Hegel 1986a, 377.
31. “Dokumentation real vorhandender Ge-
fühle, das Wieder-von-sich-Geben psychi-
schen Rohstoffs ist ihr [der Kunst] fremd.
Vergebens, abstrakt die Grenzen ziehen
zu wollen zwischen ästhetischer Fiktion
und dem Gefühlsplunder des Kitsches. Als
Giftstoff ist er aller Kunst beigemischt; ihn
aus sich auszuscheiden, ist eine ihrer ver-
zweifelten Anstrengungen heute” (Adorno
1970, 355), Engl. “The documentation of
actually existing feelings, the recapitula-
tion of psychical raw material, is foreign to
it. It is in vain to try to draw the bound-
aries abstractly between aesthetic fiction
and kitsch’s emotional plunder. It is a poi-
son admixed to all art; excising it is today
one of art’s despairing efforts.” (Adorno
1997, 239). See also Brecht 1978, ‘Das epi-
sche Theater’.
32. “Kunst hat ihren Begriff in der geschicht-
lich sich verändernden Konstellation von
Momenten; er sperrt sich der Definition.”
(Adorno 1970, 11). Engl. “The concept
of art is located in a historically changing
constellation of elements; it refuses defini-
tion.” (Adorno 1997, 2).
33. “Die Definition dessen, was Kunst sei, ist
allemal von dem vorgezeichnet, was sie
einmal war, legitimiert sich aber nur an
dem, wozu sie geworden ist, offen zu dem,
was sie werden will und vielleicht werden
kann.” (Adorno 1970, 11f.). Engl. “The
definition of art is at every point indicated
by what art once was, but it is legitimated
only by what art became with regard to
what it wants to, and perhaps can, be-
come.” (Adorno 1997, 2f.).
34. “Um inmitten des Äußersten und Finster-
sten der Realität zu bestehen, müssen die
Kunstwerke, die nicht als Zuspruch sich
verkaufen wollen, jedem sich gleichma-
chen. Radikale Kunst heute heißt so viel
wie finstere, von der Grundfarbe schwarz.”
(Adorno 1970, 65). Engl. “To survive real-
ity at its most extreme and grim, artworks
that do not want to sell themselves as con-
solation must equate themselves with that
reality. Radical art today is synonymous
with dark art; its primary color is black.”
(Adorno 1997, 39). See also Menke 1991,
191–216.
35. I agree with Rüdiger Bubner who wrote
in 1980: “Die [kritische] Theorie weiß,
daß Werke kritisch eingreifen, denn sie
weiß, daß die Autonomie der Werke dem
verblendeten Weltlauf einzig Parolie bie-
ten . . . Sie weiß deshalb auch, was wirk-
lich avantgardistisch vorwärts weist und
was allem modernem Anschein zum Trotz
sich in falscher Rückwendung verliert.
. . . Die Vorbestimmtheit einer Erkenntnis
der Kunst, die die tatsächliche Erfahrung
überflüßig macht, ist in meinen Augen
die innerste Grenze der kritischen Ästhe-
tik.” (Bubner 1989, 90). Translation by P.
Naderer: “The [critical] theory knows that
works of art intervene critically because
it knows that the work’s autonomy ex-
clusively defies the fatuous course of the
world. Therefore it knows as well about
things really pointing forward in an avant-
garde fashion and about those losing them-
selves while falsely turning backwards on
the other hand. . . . The predestination of
knowledge about art, which would make
the actual experience redundant, repre-
sents, in my eyes, the innermost threshold
of critical aesthetics.”
36. “Die Gebundenheit an einen besonderen
Gehalt und eine nur für diesen Stoff pas-
sende Art der Darstellung ist für den heu-
tigen Künstler etwas Vergangenes, und die
Kunst dadurch ein freies Instrument ge-
worden, das er nach Maßgabe seiner sub-
jektiven Geschicklichkeit in bezug auf je-
den Inhalt, welcher Art er auch sei, gleich-
mäßig zu handhaben.” (Hegel 1986b, vol.
14, 235). Engl. “Bondage to a partic-
ular subject-matter and a mode of por-
trayal suitable for this material alone are
for artists today something past, and art
therefore has become a free instrument
which the artist can wield in proportion
to his subjective skill in relation to any
material of whatever kind.” (Hegel 1975,
605).
37. Hegel 1986b, 139f.
38. Rosenkranz 1990.
39. Rosenkranz 1990, 35.
40. Adorno 1977.
41. Hegel 1986b, vol. 13, 132.
42. Hegel 1986b, vol. 14, 197, 235.
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43. Adorno writes: “So gewiß Kunstwerke
mehr sind als ihre Verfahrensweise, die im
Wort ‘Technik’ sich zusammenfaßt, so ge-
wiß haben sie objektiven Gehalt nur so
weit, wie er in ihnen erscheint, und das
geschieht einzig kraft des Inbegriffs ihrer
Technik. Deren Logik ist der Weg in die äs-
thetische Wahrheit.” (Adorno 1970, 419f.).
Engl. “However certain it is that artworks
are more than the quintessence of their
procedures, which is to say their ‘tech-
nique’, it is just as certain that they have
objective content only insofar as it ap-
pears in them, and this occurs solely by
the strength of the quintessence of their
technique. Its logic leads the way to aes-
thetic truth.” (Adorno 1997, 282).
44. Bosanquet 1968, 49f.
45. See the exhibition ‘Evidence 2014’ Gropius
Bau Berlin.
46. I thank Mr. Peter Naderer for his careful
correction-work and for his creative trans-
lations.
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